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Abstract 
 
Oxfordshire and Cambridgeshire are two of the most high tech economies in the UK (see 
for example DTI, 2002 and Garnsey and Lawton Smith, 1998). They are home to world 
class research universities and public and private research laboratories as well as a full 
range of business and professional services which support the development of their 
clusters. Building on previous work (Lawton Smith and Waters, 2011) this paper draws 
on national datasets to review the continued development of these economies. The paper 
considers issues such as new firm formation, sectoral composition and gross value added 
and relates them to social inclusion and worklessness. The paper draws on literature 
which emphasises the endogeneity of processes within regions, but also on studies which 
show that there are different kinds of high tech regions with varying industrial structures. 
Conclusions are drawn on the extent to which the presence of successful clusters 
(Spencer et al, 2010) influences outcomes for the local economy more generally, and how 
Oxfordshire and Cambridgeshire have performed over the last ten years.  
 
Keywords: high tech economies, Oxfordshire and Cambridgeshire, employment, social 
inclusion 
JEL classification: O30, O15, R11 
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1. Introduction 
 
The theme of this paper is why clusters of high tech firms might be expected to create 
social and economic inequalities within regions and the counter arguments as to why they 
might not. It has been extensively argued that the superior economic performance of high 
tech economies is associated not only with skilled-based technological change in clusters 
of innovative firms (Porter 1990, 1998, 2000, Spencer et al 2010) but also with the rate of 
growth.  Indeed Spencer et al (2010) find on the basis of Canadian data, that, when 
industries locate in an urban region with a critical mass of related industries, they tend to 
generate both higher incomes and rates of employment growth.  
 
Here we focus on why it be might be the case that equity is linked with endogenous 
growth within high tech economies, using the Spencer et al (2010) framework as a basis 
for analysis. We are particularly interested in variations in equality within high tech 
regions, for example between the city and its surrounding areas. We consider how these 
relate to economic issues such as new firm formation, unemployment, industrial 
structures, skill profiles, sectoral composition, employment in the public sector and gross 
value added to social inclusion. Oxfordshire and Cambridgeshire, two of the most 
important knowledge economies in the UK, are used as exemplars to discuss why even 
what might appear to be similar economies show different patterns of inter and intra-
regional inequalities. We should note that, although the two locations are characterised by 
clusters of high tech activity, those are insufficient in themselves for these economies to 
outstrip performance in the rest of the UK.  
 
The analysis also draws on previous research on the two economies dating back to the 
1980s (Lawton Smith 1990, Garnsey and Lawton Smith 1998, Waters and Lawton Smith 
2008, Waters 2010), and from statistical data from official sources.The paper examines 
how patterns change over time and highlights problems associated with time frames of 
analysis. We argue that labour markets are the key to understanding what is happening 
and provide the link between various conceptualizations of growth in knowledge 
economies. 
 
The paper first discusses explanations of growth in clusters, particularly in university 
city-regions such as Oxford and Cambridge. It then relates these to high tech industries 
and inequality using evidence from the two counties. Finally some conclusions are 
drawn. 
 
 
2. High tech regions, clusters, inequality and issues of growth 
 
Explanations of why some regions become high tech or knowledge-based have been 
explored from a variety of perspectives. Here we examine particular features of 
concentrations of high level knowledge, entrepreneurship and clustering, and economic 
growth; explaining why a focus on labour markets provides the link between them. We 
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review the main strands of literature which inform the interpretation of the data from 
Oxfordshire and Cambridgeshire. These include the knowledge spillover theory of 
entrepreneurship, clusters and path dependence.  
 
(i) High tech clusters and economic performance  
 
The knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship (Audretsch and Keilbach 2005) 
relates economic performance to higher investments in new knowledge such as in 
university cities, where related entrepreneurs exploit the intellectual property of local 
institutions. The explanations relate to rates of entrepreneurial activity based on new 
knowledge as a source of opportunity in different contexts, comparing high knowledge 
contexts with impoverished knowledge contexts, arguing that high knowledge contexts 
generate more entrepreneurial opportunities. Entrepreneurship is an endogenous response 
to opportunities provided by investments in new knowledge. Their localisation 
hypothesis is that knowledge spillover entrepreneurship will tend to be located within 
close geographic proximity to the source of knowledge e.g. universities. This gives the 
Entrepreneurial performance hypothesis: that the performance of knowledge-based start-
ups should be superior when they are able to access knowledge spillovers through 
proximity to knowledge sources such as universities. Finally, they propose a growth 
hypothesis:that for a given level of knowledge investment and severity of the knowledge 
filter, higher levels of economic growth should result from greater entrepreneurial 
activity. Evidence which goes some way to supporting these ideas was provided by a 
study in the US by Lendel (2010) who finds that the presence of research universities in 
metropolitan regions helps ameliorate effects of recessions. 
 
Breschi and Lissoni (2001, 978) earlier proposed a social capital explanation which 
highlights the importance of the labour market in the importance of proximity to sources 
of new knowledge. They suggest that  ‘innovators’ spatial proximity, when found to be 
significant, may not depend on any intrinsic feature of knowledge, such as its degree of 
‘tacitness’ but on a much more complex interplay between the economics of knowledge 
commodification, the labour market for scientists and technologists, and the innovators’ 
appropriation strategy.’  
 
A three stage process for successful regions (Feldman and Francis 2006) goes from latent 
activity, to high levels of entrepreneurship to fully grown entrepreneurial systems which 
have a supportive infrastructure. In such locations, new industries emerge and grow, and 
clusters evolve, renew and enter new growth phases (Trippl and Todtling 2008). These 
ideas are linked conceptually to path dependency theory. Path dependence is a function of 
two inter-related and reinforcing processes: positive feedback represented by increasing 
returns to scale, and lock-in economic agents remaining within particular paths of 
accumulation (Clark et al 2002). On growth Boschma (2007) summarising Arthur (1989, 
1994) distinguishes the (1) spin-off model, where the region grows firm-by-firm through 
spin-off dynamics and (2) the agglomeration-model – whereby the more start-ups enter a 
region, the stronger the growth. As Boschma points out, citing Martin and Sunley (2006) 
‘path dependence should not only produce space (industries creating space), but places 
also impact on path dependence processes (making it a place-dependent process).’  There 
 5 
is also place specific knowledge embodied in particular customs and practices (Clark et al 
2002). A possible further, fourth stage in Feldman and Francis’ (2006) process is that 
where regions cease to grow and a once supportive environment fails to adapt to new 
local and wider conditions, and its firms do not enter new growth phases. 
 
Returning to the theme of growth, the argument that clusters contribute to regional 
economic development has been explored in detail by Spencer et al (2010) using 
extensive sets of data from Canada. They defined a cluster as: specialisation in 
employment in an industry that is not geographically ubiquitous; co-location between 
specialised industry and other related industries; scale or critical mass (absolute total 
employment); specialisation in employment relative to the nation; and scope or breadth 
across the range of industries comprising the cluster. They found that when industries 
locate in an urban region with a critical mass of related industries, then they tend to 
generate both higher incomes and rates of employment growth. The overall prevalence of 
clustering within a city region is positively related with income levels and employment 
growth, unemployment tends to be lower. Places with multiple clusters tend to perform 
better.  They also found some variations by types of cluster, particularly manufacturing 
including biomedical and ICT, with those sectors performing better. 
 
Top clusters or ‘islands of innovation’ (Hilpert 1992, 2010) are centres of science-based 
innovation which receive a high share of public R&D expenditures. In these places there 
is a co-existence of scientific and industrial expertise and flows of expertise in and out of 
regions. More recently Hilpert has characterised such regions in the US as old industrial 
regions, leading high tech islands of innovation, diversified islands of innovation, post-
industrial agglomerations, global islands of innovation and Silicon Valley (Hilpert 2011). 
For each he examined relative balance of manufacturing and service activities. He found 
that Silicon Valley had double the amount of manufacturing and contribution to GDP 
compared with even global islands of innovation and diversified islands of innovation. 
This shows that manufacturing is a dominant feature in that economy’s success, and this 
might be an explanatory factor of why other islands of innovation vary individually in 
their growth trajectories. 
 
An important question is whether there is a limit to growth in high tech economies or 
does the principle of increasing returns (Romer 1997) apply because of the supply of new 
knowledge from the R&D base (firms, universities and research institutions)? In other 
words, it would be expected that innovation would be embedded in the system and so 
attrition where firms fall out of the system (cease trading, depart to other locations or 
through merger or acquisition) would be replaced by new ones in different markets. 
However, even if there is evidence that some high regions go through a downturn, is this 
evidence that they will become ‘old industrial agglomerations’ at worst or post-industrial 
agglomerations at best – a possible Feldman and Francis (2006) stage four scenario?  
 
(ii) High tech economies and inequality 
 
Recent studies have begun to explore the link between high tech economies and 
inequality using such indicators as unemployment, job vacancies, housing costs, and 
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wage levels. Pastor and Benner (2008) studied 326 metro areas in U.S. 1990-2000. They 
compared ‘strong market’ and ‘weak market’ regions found that inequality was 
negatively correlated with growth: city/suburb poverty; poverty concentration; income 
distribution, black-white segregation. They found that equitable regions are better 
positioned for economic growth. They therefore argued that equity must be included 
within economic strategy.  
 
Benner (2011) in a development of the 2008 study listed key measures of growth as: a 
change in earnings and employment and equity as the change in percent below poverty 
and 80/20 household income ratio. Measures of a diversified economy were: public 
sector employment, construction. He identified that manufacturing size as a proportion of 
employment was negatively correlated with a diversified economy. He found strong 
regional government/governance as a factor in the amelioration of inequalities in 
Jacksonville, Nashville City/County Mergers and Kansas City MARC.  A significant 
finding was that small portions of poorly educated population are better predictor of ‘just 
growth’ i.e. more equitable growth than high portions of highly educated population. This 
is consistent with Markusen and Shrock (2003)’s argument that metropolitan 
occupational profiles are a possible way of assessing growth potential. Further support 
for that argument is the finding in a study in Germany that regional wage differentials are 
partly attributable to localised human capital externalities (technological and pecuniary 
externalities). It is education that, ‘influences the degree to which workers of different 
education levels substitute for each other in the face of local supply shocks’ (Heurmann 
2011, 141), and the effect is particularly pronounced in manufacturing rather than in 
service sectors.  
 
Human capital has also been highlighted as being the key factor in whether a region is 
entrepreneurial and innovative.  Fritsch and Schindele (2011) argue that a high education 
level of the regional workforce and the wide availability of labour are positively related 
to the contribution of new businesses to regional employment. Rodríguez-Pose and 
Comptour (2011), in discussing whether clusters generate greater innovation and growth, 
identify three basic explanatory variables or filters. These are the R&D filter, the ‘social 
filter’, and the clusterisation filter.  The social filter refers to attributes of the population 
and workforce as reflecting socio-economic conditions that make a region innovation 
prone or innovation averse. The attributes include (i) local labour market rigidities 
including long term unemployment, (ii) demographic aspects, (iii) education, skills, and 
human capital, and (iv) the scientific base of the region. Having a good level of 
education, a strong endowment of skills or a workforce with high tech skills is crucial to 
generating and absorbing innovation, but as a way of promoting greater economic 
growth. 
 
Benner (2011) finds that the main policy implication of the findings on inequalities is that 
there is a need to build ‘diverse epistemic communities’ which will bring together 
resources to address problems of growth and inequality. These are ‘like-minded networks 
of professionals whose authoritative claim to consensual knowledge provides them with 
unique source of power in decision-making processes.’ Processes of interaction 
(interpretation, knowledge generation, action) can be institutionalized when there is a 
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need for repeated interactions over extended periods of time. Hence the resilience as well 
as the growth of clusters has to be understood in relation to the state and policy at several 
spatial levels (Hassink 2010). 
 
In sum all of these approaches are linked by the thread of human capital. This takes the 
form of people who exploit knowledge - the entrepreneurs (Audretsch and Keilbach 
2005) and people who invest in knowledge, acquire, absorb and use knowledge - their 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). This ability is in turn linked to 
education levels (Heuermann 2011). Collectively, human capital is an outcome of the 
interaction of people who create knowledge externalities within their local economies 
(Breschi and Lissoni 2001, Heuermann 2011), and who are attracted to particular places. 
Moreover, skill profiles are a way of assessing growth potential (Markusen and Shrock 
2003).  
 
We next pick up on these themes in the interpretation of the data from Oxfordshire and 
Cambridgeshire. 
 
3. High technology in Oxfordshire and Cambridgeshire 
 
The study 
 
This study replicates part of the methodology from Spencer et al (2010) in order to 
examine the link between clusters and regional economic performance. It uses only some 
of the indicators in that study. This is because not all of the information on the UK is 
currently available from official statistics or from local sources. Here we have used 
Office of National Statistics (ONS)
1
 data together with data drawn from previous studies 
in the two counties. 
 
Earlier studies have shown that high technology clusters in Oxfordshire and 
Cambridgeshire are well established (see for example Lawton Smith, 1990, Lawton 
Smith & Garnsey, 1998 Keeble et al 1999, Waters 2010 and Lawton Smith and Waters, 
2011).  Table 1 shows the distribution of firms, employment and national ranking of high 
technology industry in both counties. 
                                                 
1
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/default.asp 
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Table 1 High Technology in Oxfordshire and Cambridgeshire, 2007 
No % Rank No % Rank
Cambridgeshire 3,700       13.6     3          37,300      13.6     1          
Cambridge 900          15.6     15        11,600      13.7     30        
East Cambridgeshire 400          11.3     104      1,800       7.5       137      
Fenland 300          7.5       308      1,100       3.4       350      
Huntingdonshire 1,000       13.0     58        6,700       9.4       89        
South Cambridgeshire 1,200       16.7     8          16,100      26.0     3          
-           -           
Oxfordshire 3,900       12.3     6          35,500      11.2     5          
Cherwell 700          11.1     111      6,100       9.0       101      
Oxford 600          11.1     112      8,100       7.9       124      
South Oxfordshire 1,000       13.5     44        5,600       10.4     60        
Vale of White Horse 800          14.8     23        11,400      21.1     7          
West Oxfordshire 600          10.9     122      4,400       11.4     48        
-           -           
East 27,100      11.2     2          194,100    8.2       2          
South East 48,400      12.5     1          392,300    10.6     1          
Great Britain 243,200    10.2     - 1,984,700 7.5       -
Firms Employment
 
Source: ABI, ONS, 2008 
 
Both counties are examples of global islands of innovation (Hilpert 2011) but have 
different economic structures. Traditionally Oxfordshire has had a higher level of 
manufacturing (in high-tech and traditional industries such as motor manufacture) and as 
a consequence has had larger firms such as Oxford Instruments. Cambridge reputedly has 
had a more service orientated economy and smaller firms (Garnsey and Lawton Smith 
2008). 
 
For this study, further clusters in the case study areas, including computer manufacture, 
computer programming and publishing activities, have been identified by applying the 
first stage of Spencer et al’s (2010) methodology at the 2 digit level of the UK’s 2007 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) using data from the Business Register and 
Employment Survey compiled by the UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS).  The full 
list of sectors with a local quotient greater than one in fewer than 40 per cent of Great 
Britain’s 206 upper tier local authorities is presented in Table 2 for Oxfordshire and 
Cambridgeshire. 
 
Scientific research and development is the sector with the highest location quotient in 
both case studies and the counties rank 10
th
 and 2
nd
 respectively in Great Britain behind 
Bracknell Forest in the Thames Valley.  When location quotients (LQs) are applied to 
Glasson et al’s definition of high technology, Cambridgeshire and Oxfordshire rank 12th 
and 22
nd
 respectively among Great Britain’s 212 upper tier authorities, while the cities of 
Cambridge and Oxford rank 3
rd
 and 6
th
 respectively (see Table 1).  
 
Cambridgeshire has a higher LQ for manufacture of computer, electronic and optical 
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products than Oxfordshire, but Oxfordshire has a higher density of ‘other manufacturing’ 
but less in pharmaceuticals and leather. Oxfordshire’s strong presence in motor vehicle 
manufacturing (the BMW Mini plant at Cowley in Oxford) is shown. Taking all of the 
manufacturing together, the distribution of manufacturing activity differs between the 
counties, with each specialising in different sectors. Overall, however, unexpectedly 
Cambridgeshire has more employment (+2000) in manufacturing than Oxfordshire. 
Oxfordshire has a strong cluster in publishing, with three times as much employment in 
that sector than Cambridgeshire. 
 
As well as hosting these clusters, firms in Oxfordshire and Cambridgeshire can be 
expected to be concerned with the most knowledge intensive aspects of these industries. 
Cambridgeshire has the 4
th
 highest proportion of residents employed in managerial, 
professional and technical occupations at 52.2%, with Oxfordshire ranking 5
th
 at 51.3%, 
compared to 44.0% across Great Britain.  For professionals alone Cambridgeshire and 
Oxfordshire rank 1
st
 and 2
nd
 respectively. 
 
Clustering is identified in 59 of the 85 2 digit sectors in the SIC codes across Great 
Britain and in 17 of those are in Oxfordshire and 21 are in Cambridgeshire, with 11 being 
common to both.  In Oxfordshire there are 65,500 people working in clusters, 
representing 19.9 per cent of total employment, compared to 76,500 (26.9 per cent) in 
Cambridgeshire.  In Great Britain, over 11 million are employed in clusters, representing 
39.9 per cent of all employment.  
 
Oxfordshire and Cambridgeshire are therefore less clustered than the UK as a whole, but 
both clusters are very strong in sectors such as scientific research and development 
(particularly in Cambridge), much of it on the public sector. Manufacturing of computer, 
electronic and optical products is significantly over-represented, while the same is true in 
Oxfordshire for publishing.  However, since education (2007 SIC 85) is spread 
comparatively evenly across the country and so does not represent a cluster in this 
analysis, but accounts for 12.1 per cent of all employment in Cambridge and 14.3 per 
cent in Oxfordshire, and similarly strong showings are recorded for human health 
activities (2007 SIC 86), accounting for some of the missing employment in clusters. 
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Table 2: Clusters Identified in Oxfordshire and Cambridgeshire by 2 digit SIC code, 2009 
LQ Employment LQ Employment
18 : Printing and reproduction of recorded media 1.2 1,800           1.1 1,500           
26 : Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 2.0 2,900           3.4 4,300           
32 : Other manufacturing 2.4 2,500           1.8 1,600           
37 : Sewerage 1.5 300              1.4 300              
58 : Publishing activities 3.3 6,200           1.2 2,000           
62 : Computer programming, consultancy and related activities 1.3 7,400           1.7 8,400           
71 : Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis 1.5 8,100           1.9 8,700           
72 : Scientific research and development 3.8 5,300           8.9 10,700         
74 : Other professional, scientific and technical activities 1.6 3,100           1.3 2,200           
82 : Office administrative, office support and other business support activities 1.1 4,200           1.2 3,800           
94 : Activities of membership organisations 1.0 2,600           1.1 2,400           
08 : Other mining and quarrying 1.6 300              0.9 200              
29 : Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2.3 3,800           0.4 500              
63 : Information service activities 1.7 1,200           0.4 300              
70 : Activities of head offices; management consultancy activities 1.8 11,600         0.8 4,400           
73 : Advertising and market research 1.7 3,000           0.4 600              
90 : Creative, arts and entertainment activities 1.1 1,200           1.0 900              
17 : Manufacture of paper and paper products 0.4 300              2.1 1,200           
23 : Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 0.5 500              1.5 1,400           
27 : Manufacture of electrical equipment 0.8 700              1.4 1,100           
30 : Manufacture of other transport equipment 0.2 200              1.3 1,800           
36 : Water collection, treatment and supply 0.1 -              2.3 700              
15 : Manufacture of leather and related products 0.0 -              2.8 200              
21 : Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 0.5 200              2.7 1,000           
31 : Manufacture of furniture 0.7 700              1.0 900              
46 : Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 0.9 12,500         1.1 12,600         
78 : Employment activities 0.8 7,100           1.2 8,800           
Total Employment 329,200       284,700       
Oxfordshire Cambridgeshire
 
Source: BRES, ONS, 2010 
 
 
The implications of clustering are that “industries perform better on indicators of 
employment growth, income and unemployment when they are situated within a cluster” 
(Spencer et al 2010, 707), albeit with considerable variation by industry.  Analysis of 
national data appear to demonstrate this link as it shows that Oxfordshire and 
Cambridgeshire’s local economies are among the most productive and prosperous in 
Great Britain and Europe, exhibiting degree level attainment, remuneration and 
employment rates well above the national level, combined with lower unemployment and 
deprivation as shown in Table 3 below, where red indicates performance below and green 
performance above the national level.   
 
At the county level, Oxfordshire and Cambridgeshire outperform the country as a whole 
on every selected indicator, with the exception of new firm formation in Cambridgeshire.  
Similarly, the districts perform well compared to the national level with the exception of 
Fenland in Cambridgeshire.  These data present a picture of Oxfordshire and 
Cambridgeshire as prosperous and enterprising places with highly educated, 
economically active residents. 
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Cambridgeshire 27,819  5 of 27 28,739  5 of 27 39.5    2 of 27 7.5      17 of 27 48.5     9 of 27 75.1    10 of 27 5.3     5 of 27
Cambridge 28,544  56         30,609  57         63.4    2 4.2      329 42.6     181 74.3    130 2.1     2
East Cambridgeshire 24,135  186        28,123  99         32.3    148 5.0      314 51.0     109 82.2    3 4.2     41
Fenland 19,980  356        22,775  298        13.7    351 13.7    65 36.6     276 69.2    270 7.1     175
Huntingdonshire 25,903  124        29,072  83         35.1    108 8.9      193 49.9     114 73.8    147 7.4     191
South Cambridgeshire 32,068  24         32,380  34         40.8    51 6.8      258 58.3     66 77.5    59 5.3     85
Oxfordshire 28,383  2 of 27 29,612  4 of 27 37.9    4 of 27 6.4      22 of 27 54.9     4 of 27 76.2    4 of 27 2.9     1 of 27
Cherwell 27,378  81         29,993  64         26.1    238 7.8      232 58.3     65 79.5    25 4.5     47
Oxford 29,015  47         26,511  140        49.5    16 8.7      201 37.5     260 68.9    276 3.9     36
South Oxfordshire 26,270  110        31,507  42         34.8    113 4.3      328 67.3     37 78.8    32 1.8     1
Vale of White Horse 30,361  34         31,234  45         44.7    32 5.2      308 52.0     102 79.6    22 - -
West Oxfordshire 25,272  142        30,380  60         29.3    195 4.4      325 64.2     46 77.6    54 - -
England 26,250  - 26,268  - 32.0    - 10.8    - 49.6     - 70.5    - 7.8     -
Earnings Educational Attainment Enterprise Employment
 
Sources: ASHE, ONS, 2010, BIS, 2010, Business Demography, ONS, 2010, APS, ONS, 2011  
When considered by lower tier local authority, Oxfordshire and Cambridgeshire are 
among the least deprived parts of England
2
, with South Cambridgeshire, West 
Oxfordshire, Vale of White Horse and South Oxfordshire scoring well on all domains to 
rank among the 20 least deprived local authorities in England. Both Oxford City and 
Fenland are the most deprived local authority districts in the case studies ranking 216
th
 
and 233
rd
 respectively. 
In Oxfordshire, while South Oxfordshire, Vale of White Horse and West Oxfordshire 
have very low levels of deprivation with only one Super Output Area (SOA)
3
 featuring in 
the national lowest quartile there are 8 such SOAs in Cherwell (of 91) and 17 in Oxford 
City (of 85).  Similarly in Cambridgeshire, there are only 2 SOAs in the national lowest 
quartile in East Cambridgeshire, Huntingdonshire and South Cambridgeshire, but 10 (out 
of 54) in Fenland and 8 (out of 68) in Cambridge City. This means that within the 
counties there are steep variations in where poverty is located. In Oxfordshire, this 
problem is highest in the city of Oxford and in districts to the north of the city rather than 
in the wealthier districts where there are concentrations of the high technology activity 
shown in Table 1. A similar pattern is found in Cambridgeshire. 
 
Furthermore, both display an industrial structure with strong representation in the sectors 
the Government’s Plan for Growth (2011) identifies as being crucial in growing and 
rebalancing the UK economy. This is demonstrated in Figure 1 below.  It shows that life 
                                                 
2Using the Indices of Multiple Deprivation, 2010, published by the UK Government’s Department for 
Communities and Local Government in March 2011. 
3
 SOAs are smaller than wards and are the smallest unit of analysis for deprivation 
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sciences, to the right of the national level line, is particularly over represented in both 
counties, especially so in Oxfordshire. Software and digital media, the creative industries 
and business and professional services are also performing well. The big surprises are 
that manufacturing is performing badly in Oxfordshire, compared to the national average 
and to Cambridge, as is the Space industry in spite of the concentration of expertise at the 
Rutherford Appleton Laboratory in the Vale of White Horse District, including the site of 
the National Space Centre. 
 
Although the public sector is under-represented in both Oxfordshire and Cambridge, 
accounting for 19.2% of employment in Oxfordshire (27.2 per cent in Oxford City) and 
18.9% in Cambridgeshire (22.2% in Cambridge City), this does not include higher 
education, which accounts for almost 1 in 5 jobs in Oxford and more in Cambridgeshire. 
Based on Lendel’s (2010) analysis both cities should show economic resilience because 
the multiplier effects of their universities would mean that they are not exposed to the 
same level of vulnerability as places without such large institutions.  The policy of 
reducing employment in public sector currently being pursued in the UK, can therefore 
be expected to have less impact in Oxfordshire and Cambridgeshire than in the county as 
a whole, reflecting Government’s decisions on where to award Regional Growth Funds, 
as the public sector is comparatively small, but bolstered by very substantial education 
sectors that are not expected to see large reductions in employment. 
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Figure 1 Employment in Plan for Growth Sectors (GB=100), 2008 
75 100 125 150 175 200 225
Life Sciences
Space
Manufacturing
Software and Digital Media
Business and Professional Services
Creative Industries
Construction
Public Sector
Retail
Cambridgeshire
Oxfordshire
 
Source: ABI, ONS, 2009, BRES, ONS, 2010 
 
Moreover, when change over time is considered, the performances of Oxfordshire and 
Cambridgeshire are closer to the national level.  That is to say that although these local 
economies perform well in absolute terms, their advantages over the rest of the UK 
economy is being eroded. 
 
The new firm formation rates for both counties are shown in Figure 2. This shows that 
both the counties and their cities have been on an upward trend since 2008. Oxford and 
Oxfordshire had suffered a dip in fortunes in 2008, Cambridge slightly before that. At 
county level Oxfordshire was outperforming Cambridgeshire in 2009 and with a higher 
rate than the peak in 2005. From 2009, only the counties of Oxfordshire and 
Cambridgeshire were above the national average, with Oxfordshire considerably 
outperforming Cambridgeshire. The city of Cambridge, however, had a higher new firm 
formation rate than the city of Oxford.  This shows both inter- and intra-regional 
variations and also the importance of taking a longer term perspective than just a snap-
shot. Moreover, the pattern for the years either side of 2007 are interesting and require 
further investigation – Oxfordshire and Cambridge, and Cambridgeshire and Oxford are 
mirror images. 
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Figure 2 New Firm Formation Rate (per 10,000 residents) 
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Source: Business Demography, ONS, 2010 
 
 
Educational attainment is one of the prime indicators of high tech economies and 
locations of the clusters.  Figure 3 shows the concentrations of the highly skilled in the 
two counties. This shows that the two case studies are located within two of the densest 
concentrations of the highly skilled in the country. 
 
Cambridgeshire and Oxfordshire have the 2
nd
 and 4
th
 highest proportions of residents 
qualified to degree level of all county council areas in England at 39.5 and 37.9% 
respectively, with the cities performing particularly strongly with the 63.4% of residents 
holding degree level qualifications in Cambridge ranking it second of all 353 local 
authority districts in England (Oxford 49.5% to rank 16
th
).  There are marked differences 
in educational attainment within the counties, most notably in Cambridgeshire, where 
only 13.7% of residents are educated to degree level, the third lowest proportion in 
England. 
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Figure 3: Educational Attainment (% of Working Age) in Oxfordshire and Cambridgeshire 
(2009) 
 
Source: LFS, ONS, 2010 
 
 
Another aspect of the potential vitality of regions is the percentage of young people. 
Figure 4 shows that both Oxford and Cambridge have very high proportions of people in 
their twenties. This is of course is related to their status as university cities (both have a 
premier university and a post-1992 university) as well as a dense concentration of 
research activity in the public and private sectors.  The presence of a high proportion of 
people in their twenties, when they are most likely to be in tertiary education, allows a 
strong connection to be made between employers and education providers, facilitating the 
delivery of a demand-led labour market in both areas. This opens up the possibility of 
these workers continuing their careers in the local economy. 
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Figure 4: Demography (GB=100), 2009 
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Source: MYPE, ONS, 2010 
 
 
GVA is an indicator of productivity in particular locations. In both counties, ouput per 
capita has increased over time as it has for the country as a whole. However, although 
still exhibiting lower GVA per capita than Oxfordshire, Cambridgeshire has shown 
stronger growth than Oxfordshire since 2001, increasing at over twice the national rate in 
2008.  However, Oxfordshire, despite its concentration of clusters and its world-class 
science base, only matched national increases in GVA per capita to 2004 and has 
displayed markedly lower rates of growth since then (Figure 5).  
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Figure 5: Gross Value Added per Capita and Annual Change (2001-2008) 
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Source: ONS, Regional Accounts, 2010 
 
The figures for jobs Growth 2008-2009 are shown in Table 4. This shows that although 
Oxfordshire lost 1.6% of employee jobs in 2009, this was still the 11
th
 strongest growth 
of all 27 county council areas. Cambridgeshire’s loss of 4.4% ranked the county 25th of 
27 with a national fall of 2.9%. The fortunes of the cities showed greater variation. 
Oxford lost only 0.6%, Cambridge lost 5% and was ranked 297
th
 of the 380- local 
authority districts in Great Britain.  Oxfordshire’s biggest job losses were in the rural 
areas, excluding the district Vale of White Horse which has the government laboratories 
and big cluster of firms.  Nevertheless, both counties continue to exhibit employment 
rates well in excess of the national rate. 
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Table 4 Jobs Growth, 2008-9 
No. % Rank No. % Rank
Oxfordshire 310,000     -5,000 -1.6 11 329,200     -2,600 -0.8 11
Cherwell 67,000       -200 -0.3 90 71,100       300 0.4 91
Oxford 103,300     -700 -0.6 97 106,900     -200 -0.2 111
South Oxfordshire 49,500       -2,400 -4.6 287 54,100       -1,700 -3.0 233
Vale of White Horse 53,200       -400 -0.8 105 56,800       -100 -0.3 113
West Oxfordshire 36,900       -1,400 -3.6 232 40,300       -800 -2.0 178
Cambridgeshire 267,400     -12,200 -4.4 25 284,700     -9,700 -3.3 23
Cambridge 85,000       -4,500 -5.0 295 89,000       -3,900 -4.2 294
East Cambridgeshire 22,800       -500 -2.0 153 25,000       -100 -0.3 115
Fenland 29,600       -1,200 -3.7 240 31,800       -800 -2.5 203
Huntingdonshire 68,200       -3,200 -4.5 281 72,800       -2,500 -3.4 263
South Cambridgeshire 61,700       -2,900 -4.5 279 66,100       -2,300 -3.4 270
Great Britain 26,206,100 -783,500 -2.9 - 27,970,900 -653,200 -2.3 -
Employees Total Employment
Total
Change
Total
Change
 
Source: BRES, ONS, 2010 
 
Table 4 shows relatively low levels of job losses over the start of the recession in 
Oxfordshire compared with the rest of the UK.  However, consistent with earlier data on 
deprivation, the impact in Oxfordshire is on more deprived urban areas of Oxford and 
areas to the north of the county, including Bicester and Banbury. Moreover, it should be 
acknowledged that, in addition to the knowledge intensive activities, Oxford has a 
considerable proportion of low-skilled, low-wage labour in Oxfordshire (Carpenter, 
2011), which might be a factor in pulling the county’s performance down (c.f. Benner 
2011).  
 
Next we discuss change in earnings over the period 2006 – 2010. Across Great Britain, 
workplace based median annual full time pay increased by 0.3% to stand at £25,993.  
This rate of growth was exceeded in both Oxfordshire and Cambridgeshire where pay 
rose by 2.9% and 0.9% respectively to £28,383 and £27,819, the 2
nd
 and 5
th
 highest 
among the 27 county council areas.  Median pay was higher in the cities than the more 
rural districts. 
 
Earnings at the 25
th
 percentile grew faster than those at the 75
th
 percentile in Great 
Britain. However, in Oxford the greatest increase in earnings was recorded for those 
earning most, with the 75
th
 percentile seeing a 2.8% increase compared to 2.5% at the 
25
th
 percentile.  In Cambridgeshire a similar pattern emerged, but with those at the 75
th
 
percentile seeing a smaller decrease that those at the 25
th
 percentile as shown in Figure 6 
below. 
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Figure 6: Annual Change in Earnings (2009-2010) 
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Source: ASHE, ONS, 2010 
 
These latest data reverse the recent trends where the lower paid have seen their pay grow 
faster than the better paid, gross annual pay for those working full time in Oxfordshire 
having risen by 15% at the 25
th
 percentile since 2001 compared to 12% at the 75
th
, and by 
12% compared to 8% in Cambridgeshire.  These data suggest that prior to the recession 
the lower paid had been benefiting from the economic strength of Oxfordshire and 
Cambridgeshire, but that, as the UK economy contracted, in contrast to the country as a 
whole, it was the higher paid in Oxfordshire and Cambridgeshire that were better able to 
defend their standard of living. They also suggest that the benefits of hosting clusters, 
particularly clusters of knowledge-intensive high technology industries, may accrue 
chiefly to those employed in the cluster rather than to the broader economy. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This paper’s theme is the wider benefits of successful clusters in regional economic 
development. We demonstrate that both Oxfordshire and Cambridgeshire are high 
performing clusters but that in each case cluster development is insufficient by itself to 
guarantee that the county’s economic growth outperforms that of the national economy.  
 
We show that these are different kinds of high tech regions with varying industrial 
structures, and that this may account for the differences in performance within and 
between the two counties. There is an association of cluster and economic performance 
indicated by where job losses have been felt.  Overall, they are economies with clusters 
do well, both are well known clusters, but rates of growth are not as good aswe would 
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expect.  While Oxfordshire’s growth has slowed in the last three years to be closer the 
national average, Cambridge has slightly outperformed Oxfordshire but from a lower 
base. What is not clear is whether there is evidence that either cluster-based economy 
have run out of steam and that there is evidence of a fourth stage in either or both. This 
study therefore highlights the importance of longitudinal research which monitors trends 
and their outcomes over time, and that comparisons are made between regions that on the 
surface seem to have similar characteristics. 
 
We show that while there is some evidence that the economies had been becoming more 
inclusive, in recessionary times that effect diminishes. The lowest 25% quartile who are 
not paid as much had appeared to be doing relatively better, especially in Oxfordshire. It 
could be, however, that the sectors in which the lowest paid are employed were doing 
better than the ones in high tech sectors – hence counter argument to benefits of clusters.  
 
The strength of the clusters in each county gives some support for the knowledge theory 
of entrepreneurship Audretsch and Keilbach (2005) – the localisation and endogenous 
entrepreneurship hypotheses - both are high knowledge centres and high levels of 
entrepreneurship. There is, however, mixed evidence on regional performance on various 
indicators. 
 
We have attempted to show that it is the labour market that explains both the vitality of 
clusters and differences in performance within and between locations (Lawton Smith and 
Waters 2011).The link between clusters, economic growth and labour market activity of 
city region economies is, however, complex and requires understanding of occupational 
profiles and inter-segment recruitment (Markusen and Shrock 2003).  
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